心-身问题与物理主义

Mind-body Problem and Physicalism

笛卡尔的心-身区别论证开启了近代以来有关心-身问题的争论,而物理主义则是当前学界在处理心-身问题时的常见立场。本文打算为其中一个具体的物理主义观点——戴维森版殊型同一论作辩护。我将论证,经过适当改进之后的殊型同一论,不仅能有效避免其他物理主义观点目前所面临的种种困扰,而且有望为我们大多数人所持有的那种内在心灵不同于外在事物的心-身二元直觉,提供一个合理的解释。

Generally speaking, the mind-body problem derives from Descartes＇ s argument for the distinction between mind and body. Obviously, in contemporary debate on the mind-body problem, physicalism is the most commonly taken position. This paper argues for one kind of physicalism, viz., token-identity theory. The author shows that, in contrast with other physicalistic theories, token-identity theory is a more competitive view, since it can not only deal with these problems which have always tortured other physicalistic theories, but also reasonably explain our intuition of the distinction between mind and body.