摘要
身心平行论是19世纪末在西方哲学界和科学界占统治地位的命题。柏格森从逻辑维度、经验维度、历史维度三个方面对其进行了严格的批判。在逻辑上,身心平行论混用了两种描述世界的不同记录体系,这种混用是不合法的。在经验上,身心平行论有悖于某些经验事实。从历史维度来看,身心平行论并非一个科学命题,而是一个形而上学命题,来自17世纪的形而上学,其源头可以上溯到古希腊哲学。古代和现代之间的科学观的转换,也导致了古代的平行论转变为现代哲学中的身心平行论。
The parallelism of mind and body problem, which is quite prevailing in philosophy and in natural sciences by the end of the 19 th century, was severely criticized by Bergson from in terms of logic, experience and history. In logic, parallelism confuses two different recording systems used for describing the world. In experience, it goes against some empirical facts. Bergson also points out that, instead of being a scientifi c proposition, the parallelism is a metaphysical proposition that comes directly from the philosophy of 17 th century and whose origin roots in the ancient Greek philosophy. The transformation from the ancient view of science to the modern one has resulted in the transformation of ancient parallelism into that in the modern philosophy.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期30-35,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“欧洲生命哲学的新进展”(项目编号:14ZDB018)子课题“法国生命哲学的新发展”