摘要
范·弗拉森促使关于最佳解释推理(IBE)的争论集中于IBE与贝叶斯推理的相容性,但是他用动态大弃赌定理作为论据来批判IBE是一种误导。通过对IBE作出狭义、中义和广义的区分,可以更为细致地考察和发展范·弗拉森的合理观点,得出结论:IBE不是独立的推理,无论是科学辩护方面还是"助发现"意义上的科学发现方面,IBE都是相容于贝叶斯推理的。
Driven by van Fraasen's attack on IBE, recent debates about Inference to the Best Explanation focus on whether IBE is compatible with Bayesian inference. However, it is misleading that he opposes IBE with the principle of dynamic Dutch Book. By distinguishing between the narrow IBE, the intermediate IBE and the wide IBE, we make more detailed examination on van Fraasen's argument and develop his reasonable opinion. The conclusion is that: IBE is not an independent form of inference. Furthermore, IBE is compatible with Bayesian inference not only in the domain of scientifi c justifi cation but also in the domain of scientifi c discovery as "discovery-making aid".
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期36-42,共7页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
教育部项目"社会科学哲学视野下的科学解释与人文理解"(项目编号:13YJC720044)
关键词
最佳解释推理
贝叶斯推理
决策推理
似然推理
可爱性
动态大弃赌
Inference to the best explanation
Bayesian inference
Decision-making inference
Likelihood inference
Loveliness
Principle of dynamic Dutch Book