建筑市场业主和承包商行为策略演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Owner and Contractor Behaviour Strategies

首先将业主群体和承包商群体可视为有限理性的两个博弈群体,群体中的个体通过对成功者策略的模仿实现策略演化,最终进化稳定状态。然后对演化过程,演化稳定状态和演化稳定策略进行分析,结果表明,建筑市场的自发演化,往往会导致业主群体和承包商群体都走向不严格履约的进化稳定策略。最后在建立业主和承包商的信息公开以及信用记录体系后,指出建筑市场朝良性发展,只依靠长期信用体系的约束,不能完全避免业主和承包商的道德风险,必须引入更加强硬的约束和惩罚机制,如工程担保等。

First, regarding owners and contractors as two player groups with bounded rationality, individuals imitates the strategies of game winners to realize evolution of strategy, the two groups reaches an evolutionary stable status lastly. By analyzing the evolution process, evolutionary stable status and evolutionary stable strategy, the analysis results reveal that the spontaneous evolution of construction market leads to an unfavorable evolutionary stable strategy. Last, it points out the construction market toward the benign development, only relying on the credit system cannot be completely avoid moral hazard of the owner and the contractor, must introduce into tougher constraints and punishment mechanism, such as engineering guarantee.