公司并购中的中介治理效应——基于风险过滤视角的实证分析

The Governance Effect of Intermediary Agencies in M&A:Empirical Analysis Based on Perspective of Risk Filtration

西方国家上市公司股权更迭的一般规律显示,中介机构参与是公司并购的显著特征,但现有文献对公司并购中的中介治理效应尚缺少中国情境下的实证分析。文章首先对不同类型中介机构在公司并购中的功能定位及其属性特征进行情境定位,然后基于高管认知调研与公司并购选择的双重视角描述中介机构在公司并购中的聘任倾向及现实分布,并以此为基础对其中介治理效应进行实证检验,结果发现:中介机构确能在公司并购中发挥过滤并购风险、提升并购绩效的战略效能,且其治理效应与聘任数量及聘任类型显著相关。由此验证并拓展了"中介机构职能观",同时也可为公司并购选聘匹配的中介机构以及中介机构优化服务质量提供经验证据。

Just as the general rule of the change of listed companies ＇ shareholding in western countries shows that, intermediary agencies involving is the salient features of the company＇s mergers and acquisitions. However, the existing literature on the governance effects of intermediary agencies in mergers and acquisitions is still a ~ack of empirical analysis in the Chinese context. Firstly, different types of intermediary agencies in mergers and acquisi- tions were situational positioned according to functional orientation and attribute characteristics in this article. And then, it describes the appointment tendency and the real distribution of intermediary agencies in mergers and acquisitions based on executives＇ cognitive research and company＇ s choice, which is as a basis for empirical treatment of intermediary agencies＇ governance effect. The results shows that： intermediary agencies do play a strategic part in mergers and acquisitions, it can help reduce M＆A risk and enhance the effectiveness of strategic M＆A performance, moreover, its treatment effect is significantly correlated with the number and the type of appointments. Thus, it validate and expand the ＂concept of intermediary agencies＇ functions＂, but also provide evidence for companies＇ hiring matched intermediaries in M＆A as well as intermediary agencies to optimize the quality of service.