我国房地产调控政策的制定与执行——基于博弈论与激励理论的建模分析

The Design and the Implementation of Real Estate Regulation Policy in China——Modeling Analysis Based on Game Theory and Incentive Theory

探讨中国房地产调控政策的实施效率及未来的制度设计。构建包含地方政府与中央政府的不完全信息重复博弈模型,分析中国房地产调控政策博弈的演化过程,结果表明,与单期博弈不同,重复博弈均衡并非一成不变,而是一个依赖博弈双方持有信念及策略收益的动态过程;在房市施行"分类调控"的新常态下,进一步借助激励理论探讨中央政府如何通过制度设计来兼顾多元化目标并应对委托代理带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题。研究发现,通过构建一组以房地产价格和经济增长为信号的随机契约,中央政府可以在兼顾经济增长和调控房地产价格的同时提高政策效力。

The paper discusses the implementation efficiency and the future policy design of China＇s real estate regulation policy. By building repeated game model with incomplete information which contains the local government and central government, this paper studies the evolution process of the policy in China. Results show that differeiat from single phase, repeated game equi- librium is not a single static state, but a dynamic process which depends on beliefs and earnings held by both sides. Furthermore, based on the incentive theory, this paper discusses the design of real estate regulation policy in China under the new normal ＂classification regulation＂, and the policy design for the central government to take into account the diversity goals and deal with the reverse choice and moral risks brought by the principal - agents. By building a set of random con- tract with the signal of house prices and economic growth rate, the central government can regulate house prices, promote economic growth, and improve the efficiency of policy.