车载网中面向隐私保护的证书撤销列表部署方案

Deployment scheme of certificate revocation lists for privacy protection in vehicle area network

人们往往利用公共密钥基础设施(PKI)和每个车辆的化名证书池来研究车载网络的安全和隐私要求,利用这些证书署名消息,通过传播证书撤销列表(CRL)可将行为不端的车辆从网络中删除。分析了CRL部署与隐私保护的关系,提出一种基于停放车辆的CRL部署方案。该方案利用两个哈希链来计算车辆的CRL,防止过去化名和被撤销化名发生关联,并显著降低了通信开销;通过使用停放车辆提升了网络连通性,降低了延时。仿真结果表明,该方法可有效保护隐私,即使是对证书被撤销的车辆也可防止泄露位置信息,显著提高了车载网络的效率和安全性。

Security and privacy requirements in vehicular networks are typically addressed using a public key infrastructure （PKI） and pools of pseudonymous certificates for each vehicle. Messages are signed with these certificates, so that misbeha- ving vehicles can be excluded from the network by disseminating certificate revocation lists （CRL）. This paper analyzed the relationship between the certificate revocation lists and the privacy protection, proposed a CRL deployment scheme based on the parked vehicles, which computing the CRL on vehicles using two hash chains, and preventing the linking of past pseudo- nyms to revoked ones, substantially reducing communication overhead. In addition, it proposed the use of parked vehicles to increase connectivity and thereby decrease the delay. The simulation results show that the proposed method is privacy preser- ving and prevents the disclosure of location information even for vehicles with revoked certificates, and significantly improves the efficiency and safety of vehicular area network.