美国并购集团诉讼的剖析与借鉴

The Dissection and Implication of U.S M&A Class Action

美国并购集团诉讼,作为一种新型的区别于派生诉讼或证券欺诈集团诉讼的诉讼模式,一经产生即发展成为美国股东诉讼的主导形式。由于并购集团诉讼在促进公司治理代理成本与诉讼代理成本实质减少方面发挥着重要作用,其已成为美国上市公司并购索赔案的首选。本文从剖析美国并购集团诉讼的优势入手,比较美国并购集团诉讼与我国代表人诉讼制度之差异,立足我国上市公司并购市场乱象,分析我国引进并购集团诉讼的必要性与可行性,提出在我国并购集团诉讼制度移植策略与建议。

The acquisition-oriented class action in the United States, distinct from derivative lawsuits or securities fraud class claims, has emerged and soon become a dominant form of shareholder litigations. For its important role in substantially reducing the managerial agency costs in corporate governance and litigation agency costs, the acquisition-oriented class action has been a preferred remedy for the US public companies in acquisition claims. This article dissects the advantage of the acquisition-oriented class action in the United States and compares the differences between it and the representative action in China. Based on the chaotic situation of Chinese listed companies acquisition market, the article analyzes the necessity and feasibility for China to introduce the acquisition-oriented class action and further presents practicable strategies and suggestions for the transplantation of acquisition-oriented class action in China.