摘要
无论是基于争夺经济资源的金融竞争还是自上而下的政治标尺竞争,地方政府的金融干预行为都可能呈现出空间相关性。通过构建金融干预行为的反向复合指标,且在广义空间计量模型中分别引入非对称权重矩阵与两区制划分,发现省级政府之间确实存在着针对金融干预的模仿竞争,但是误差冲击又导致了地方政府的差异化反应。同时,在政绩竞赛中落后会增强省级政府对其竞争者干预行为的敏感性,而内陆省份相比于沿海省份的空间相关程度也更高。这一结论在加强中央政府的金融协调监管职能以及尽快转变GDP导向的政绩考核标准层面,具有重要的政策启示意义。
Whether it is the economic competition based on the struggle for economic resources or the top-down political yardstick competition, the financial intervention by local governments is like- ly to present its spatial correlation. This paper constructs reverse composite index depicting financial intervention and introduces the asymmetric weight matrix and the two-regime division into the gener- alized spatial econometric model, then it is found that there do exist imitative competitions towards financial interventions between provincial governments, but the error shock might lead to differentiated responses of the local governments. Meanwhile, those stragglers in the government performance com- petition will increase the sensitivity of the provincial governments towards the intervention from the competitors, while the inland provinces have higher degree of spatial correlation compared to the coastal provinces. This conclusion may have great significance in policy enlightenment for the central government to strengthen its role of financial coordination and supervision and give up the GDP-ori- ented performance evaluation as soon as possible.
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第8期47-58,共12页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目"金融干预视角下区域资本流动的空间关联与经济协调发展研究"(12CJL060)
国家社会科学基金重点项目"基础设施产业特许经营合约中的政府承诺问题及其治理研究"(13AJL011)
国家社会科学基金青年项目"过剩条件下促进经济适度发展的结构优化理论与对策研究"(13CJL015)
江西财经大学校级课题资助
关键词
政府竞争
金融干预
非对称权重矩阵
两区制广义空间计量模型
inter-governmental competition
financial intervention
asymmetric weight matrix
two-regime generalized soatial econometric model