双寡头竞争平台的水平关系研究

A Study of the horizontal relations of duopoly competitive platforms

通过建立模型,并将负的组内网络外部性和正的组间网络外部性引入到模型中,研究双寡头竞争平台的水平关系策略选择。研究结果表明,当达成兼容的成本不是太高且两边的正组间网络外部性效应较大时,两个平台的最优选择是兼容;当达成兼容的成本较高但两边的正组间网络外部性效应较大时,两个平台的最优选择是不兼容但存在用户多归属;当达成兼容的成本较高且两边的正组间网络外部性效应也不够大时,两个平台的最优选择是不兼容且不存在用户多归属。同时,商家一边负的组内网络外部性效应及产品或服务的差异化程度也会影响到平台的策略选择,具体取决于参数的取值。

By setting up a model and introducing the externality of negative intra - group network and positive inter - group network into the model, this paper studies the horizontal relations of duopoly competitive platforms. The results show that when the cost of reaching compatibility between both two - sided platforms isnt too high and the effects of positive inter - group network externalities on both sides of the platform are bigger, both platforms prefer compatibility. When the cost of reaching compatibility between both two -sided plat- forms is higher but the effects of positive inter - group network externalities on both sides of the platform are bigger, both platforms prefer the strategy of incompatibility with multihoming. When the cost of reaching compatibility between both two - sided platforms is higher and the effects of positive inter - group network externalities on both sides of the platform are not bigger, both platforms prefer the strategy of incompatibility without multihoming. At the same time, the strategy choice of the platform is concretely affected by the size of the parameter of negative intra - group network externalities among merchants and the differentiation degree of the product or service on the side of the merchant of the platform.