摘要
零售商与上游拥有双渠道的制造商共享其零售利润换取低价订购的权利,能使供应链得以协调、系统利润最大化,也能有效降低渠道价格冲突;合理设置利润共享参数能够使二者的利润均得到帕累托改善。基于合作博弈角度的契约谈判分析表明:当两成员均为风险规避者时,未必可以通过增强自己的风险厌恶程度来增加自身利润;但谈判能力越强,享有的利润增量比例就越高,从另一成员获取的转移支付也就越高。风险中性的零售商面临风险规避的双渠道制造商时,可能会选择合作,但对于风险规避程度可以逐步增强的制造商,零售商会有抵触心理。
The retailers share their retail profits with the suppliers so that they can obtain products in a low wholesale price which can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain,maximize the system profit,and reduce the price conflict between the two channels.A properly chosen profit sharing parameter can make the profits of the two members achieve Pareto-improvements.We examine the contract negotiation and find that：（1）the risk-averse supplier cannot necessarily increase its profit by raising its risk-averse degree when the retailer is also risk-averse;（2）however,the stronger a member’s relative negotiating power is,the bigger share of extra profit it will obtain and also the higher the compensation fee it will receive from the other member;（3）a risk-neutral retailer has an incentive to cooperate with a risk-averse supplier nevertheless,a risk-averse retailer may attempt to avoid a rather risk-averse supplier as its partner.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第7期43-51,共9页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301150)
郑州大学优秀青年教师专项科研基金资助项目(F0000430)
关键词
供应链协调
双渠道
利润共享
契约谈判
Supply Chain Coordination
Dual-channel
Profit Sharing Contracts
Contract Negotiation
