期刊文献+

日本公司治理中的外国对冲基金股东积极主义辨析 被引量:2

The Foreign Hedge Fund's Shareholder Activism of Japan's Corporate Governance
原文传递
导出
摘要 在欧美等国表现活跃的外国对冲基金进入日本并推行股东积极主义已有10多年的历史,然而这些对冲基金在日本发展的历程及其所取得的成效等与在美国大相径庭,这些对冲基金由活跃转为安静,对日本企业的影响也非常有限。研究指出,全球公司治理结构趋同下欧美以"股东利益至上"为代表的公司治理模式与日本"以企业为核心"的治理模式之间的巨大摩擦与碰撞,是深层次的原因所在。而这种碰撞由于两种模式下企业属性、发展基础以及政治法律的路径不同,导致短期内难以调和。这些给了我们很好的启示,各国公司治理有其自身特点,在推行"股东优先"理念的时候需要因地制宜,同时也要积极引导。 The foreign hedge funds that are very active in US have entered in Japan and pushed the shareholder's activism for more than 10 years. As opposed to what they have successfully achieved in US, these funds are becoming more and more quieter, and have very limited impact on Japan' s companies' performance. Research shows that the underlying reason is the big conflict between the US - style corporate governance characterized by shareholder supreme and the traditional Japan - style corporate governance characterized by corporate supreme given the so called the convergence of corporate governance on the global basis. It is hard to mitigate this conflict in the foreseeable coming years given the stark contrast between the two types companies' nature, basis of the development and the political and legal path. All of this gives us a good lesson, that specific country has its own unique characters, thus people should carry out the specific measures tailored to the local conditions once they want to perform the shareholder activism, and people also need to guide it actively and carefully.
作者 吴三强
出处 《现代日本经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期47-58,共12页 Contemporary Economy OF Japan
关键词 日本 公司治理模式 外国对冲基金 股东积极主义 委托代理 Japan, style of corporate governance, foreign hedge fund, shareholder activism, principle and agency
  • 相关文献

参考文献14

  • 1冯果,李安安.投资者革命、股东积极主义与公司法的结构性变革[J].法律科学(西北政法大学学报),2012,30(2):112-121. 被引量:37
  • 2John Buchanan. Hedge Fund Activism in Japan[ M ]. New York:Cambridge University Press,2012:156.
  • 3Yasushi Hamao & Pedor Matos. Foreign Investor Activism in Japan: The First 10 Years[ R].USC FBE Finance Semi-nar,2010:4.
  • 4Jenson. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers [ J ]. The American Economic Review, 1986,(76) :3 -5.
  • 5Yukie Saito. Corporate Governance and Active Engagement in Japan [ J ]. Journal of Sustainable Finance & Invest- merit,2012, (11) :179 - 197.
  • 6平力群.浅析日本公司法规范与实践调整的战略考量[J].日本学刊,2013(5):96-112. 被引量:3
  • 7Gilles Hilary. Shareholder Activism in Japan : Social Pressure, Private Cost and Organized Crime [ R ]. Center for Eco- nomic Institutions, Hitotsubashi University ,2003:4.
  • 8Berle&Means.现代公司与私有产权[M].北京:商务印书馆,2007:17-42.
  • 9Manne. Merger and Market for Corporate Control[ J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1965, (73) : 10.
  • 10Andrew Junkin and Thomas That. The CalPERS Effect on Targeted Company Share Prices [ R ]. Wilshire Associates Incorporated ,2009 : 9.

二级参考文献26

  • 1梁上上.股东表决权:公司所有与公司控制的连接点[J].中国法学,2005(3):108-119. 被引量:95
  • 2尚福林.《机构持股已占全部流通市值70》,载《中国证券报》2010年12月18日.
  • 3(美)彼得·L·伯恩斯坦.投资新革命(M).高小红,译.北京:机械工业出版社,2010.
  • 4(西)戈西马丁·阿尔弗雷泽.跨境上市——国际资本市场的法律问题(M).刘轶,等译.北京:法律出版社,2010.
  • 5L.Laeven.Does Financial Liberalization Reduce Financial Constraints(J).Financial Management,Spring2003.
  • 6(美)塔玛·弗兰克.证券化——美国结构融资的法律制度(M).潘攀,译.北京:法律出版社,2009.
  • 7Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor.Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers(J).Journals of Financial Economics,92(3),2009.
  • 8Frank H.Easterbrook&Daniel R.Fischel.The Economic Structure of Corporate Law(M).Harvard University Press,1991.
  • 9(英)保罗·戴维斯.英国公司法改革(M)//.赵旭东.国际视野下的公司法改革.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2007.
  • 10(日)田泽元章.IT化进程中的日本股份公司法修改(M)//.渠涛.中日民商法研究.北京:法律出版社,2005.

共引文献39

引证文献2

二级引证文献4

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部