海盗袭击突发事件形成机理的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Engendering Mechanism for Pirate Attacks

为了准确分析海盗袭击的决策行为与预测海盗袭击事件发生的可能性,在同时考虑海盗与海军两个群体决策行为的基础上,根据演化博弈理论建立海军护航下海盗袭击决策的非对称演化博弈模型,并分别推导出海盗采取袭击策略与海军采取护航策略的复制动态方程.通过对复制动态方程参数的讨论,确立了不同的博弈情境,并分别对各个情境下博弈的演化过程与稳定策略(ESS)进行分析.最后,以近年来索马里海盗活动的实际数据进行了实例模拟,模拟结果符合海盗活动的实际情况.理论分析和实例模拟结果表明,海盗袭击事件形成主要受袭击收益与海盗劫持成功率影响,海军护航行动使海盗更倾向于选择不袭击策略.

In order to analyse the decision-making progress of pirates and to predict the possibility of pirate attacks, this paper creates an asymmetry evolutionary game model from the viewpoints of both pirates and navies＇ decision behaviour. Using evolutionary game theory, this model describes the decision-making progress of pirates under naval escort. Then the replicator dynamics equations of pirate attack strategy and navy escort strategy are developed. Through discussing the parameters＇ values of the replicator equations, different game situations are established and evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） under different, situations are analysed. Finally, the recent data of Somali pirates are taken as an example simulation and the simulation result accords with reality. The results of theory analysis and example simulation show that decision-making of pirate attacks is mainly influenced by attack revenue and success rate and naval escort make pirates more willing to choose not attack strategy.