亚里士多德论偶性

Aristotle's view of accidents

"就偶性而言的存在"是亚里士多德揭示的四种存在方式之一。本文利用亚里士多德讨论偶性的核心文本,亦即《形而上学》E 2-3,并结合理查德·索拉比和多萝西·弗雷德讨论这一主题的相关文献,深入分析了亚里士多德在其中所表达的有关偶性的形而上学思想,揭示了偶性的存在论的内涵,即,它并不指向反常或例外的事情,也不仅仅指各种伴随性的属性,而是在更根本的意义上指向一类基本的存在,即具体的可感事物,因为构成偶性存在的根本规定的是"可以是别样",而这恰恰是一切经验存在物的基本存在方式。

Accidental being is one of the four senses of being declared by Aristotle. This paper uses Metaphysics E 2-3,the central texts in which Aristotle discusses accidental being,as well as the relevant literatures by Richard Sorabji and Dorothea Frede,and gives an incisive analysis of Aristotle's metaphysical thought on accidents. It clarifies the ontological implications of accidents,that is,it refers neither to the abnormal or the exceptional,nor solely to all kinds of concomitant attributes,but rather essentially to a type of fundamental being,i. e. particular sensible things. For what essentially defines accidental being is the phrase,'it can be otherwise',which is just the fundamental way of all empirical beings.