基于非合作博弈的窜货成因及整治措施研究

Causes and Control Measures of Fleeing Goods Based on Non-Cooperative Game

在总结窜货相关背景的基础上,利用非合作博弈模型对窜货的成因进行了分析,用纳什均衡结果解析了当企业整治窜货不力时分销商窜货行为的必然性。根据非合作博弈论的原理,提出了整治分销商窜货的两条措施:一是增强区域市场督察能力,提高发现分销商窜货行为的概率;二是建立和实施刚性的处罚制度,加大对窜货行为的处罚额度。

Based on the summary of fleeing goods related background, using a non- cooperative game model, we analyzed on the causes of fleeing goods and the inevitability of distributor fleeing goods when enterprises control fleeing goods ineffectively. According to the non-cooperative game theory, we put forward two measures in controlling distributor fleeing goods, and one is to enhance the regional market supervision ability and improve found distributors selling behavior probability, and two is to es- tablish and carry out rigid punishment system to increase the amount of such behavior.