伯川德竞争下供应链信息泄露问题的研究

Study of information leakage in a supply chain under Bertrand competition

文章探讨了供应链成员面对信息泄露时所做出的决策,考虑包含1个供应商和2个进行价格竞争的零售商的供应链,其中一个零售商为主导零售商,拥有市场需求的私有信息,另一个零售商追随主导零售商的决策,为跟随零售商。零售商与供应商进行信息共享和合作定价,而供应商则可能将主导零售商的定价信息泄露给跟随零售商。通过建立相关的信号博弈模型,分析了存在信息泄露问题的情况下,供应链成员的决策并得出零售商的分离均衡定价。出乎意料的是,相互竞争的零售商在信息泄露的情形下,能获得更大的利润。

This paper explores the decisions of the members facing the effect of information leakage in a supply chain including one supplier and two Bertrand retailers. The retailers share information and make cooperative pricing with the supplier. One retailer has private information about uncertain market potential, as the incumbent. The other retailer follows the incumbent＇ s decisions, as entrant. The price information of the incumbent may be leaked to the entrant Joy the supplier. By applying game theory and constructing signaling game,model, the members＇ decisions are analyzed and the separating equilibrium price of retailers under the information leakage is given. Surprisingly, under the information leakage, the competitive retailers benefit more than non-leakage.