极端洪水灾害风险管理四方合作机制的博弈分析

Game Analysis in Quartet Cooperation Mechanism of Extreme Flood Disasters Risk Management

针对我国洪水灾害、尤其是极端洪水灾害发生概率和频率不断增加的情况,借鉴国内外的研究成果和洪水风险管理现状,提出了在中央政府主导下,中央政府、地方政府、公众、市场四方参与的极端洪水灾害管理合作机制。利用博弈论的原理,构建该机制下四方联盟建立的单期静态博弈模型及重复博弈模型,并对其模型进行了分析。分析发现:在重复博弈下,联盟核心给出的最优激励值承诺受到联盟核心现时评价率以及联盟参与者其他机会收益的影响;联盟参与者不参与联盟而获得的机会收益越高,越能使联盟各方获得最大收益,保证联盟稳定运作。

In view of the situation that flood disasters especially extreme flood disasters are becoming more and more fre- quent in China, and learning from research results and present situations of flood risk management both at home and abroad, a quartet cooperation mechanism of extreme flood disasters management is proposed, which is under the leadership of the Central Government and cooperated by the Central Government, local government, public and market. With the principles of game theory, the single period static game model and repeated game model of the alliance under such mechanism are estab- lished, and the models are analyzed. It is proved that, in the situation of repeated games, the optimal incentive value commit- ment provided by the alliance core is influenced by the present evaluation rate and the other opportunity benefit of the alli- ance participants. The higher the opportunity benefit without alliance participants, more chances of alliance parties get the maximum benefit, which guarantees the stability of the alliance.