基于委托代理理论的高校教师激励模型研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanisms for College Teachers Based on the Principal-agent Theory

高校管理者与高校教师之间实质上是委托代理关系,本文从二者存在不对称信息的角度出发,通过对创新教育背景下教学主体行为的的剖析,将高校教师的工作划应分为教学努力、学习方法指导努力和科研努力三个要素,而三要素之间存在关联关系,然后运用多任务委托代理理论对教师激励机制进行研究,提出了一种基于模糊随机机会约束规划的高校教师激励引导的模型,并研究了数学模型的可解性。

Principal-agent Relationship is a substantial relationship between university administrators and university teachers. From the perspective of asymmetric information between university administrators and university teachers, we divide college teachers teaching into three elements： the teaching work, learning method guidance and research efforts by analyzing the behavior of the teaching body under the background of Innovative Education. The three elements have the incidence relation. By researching the incentive mechanisms of college teachers with multi-task principal-agent theory, we propose an optimization mode of university teachers motivate-guided based on fuzzy random chance-constrained programming. In this paper, we propose some reasonable suggestions considering college actual situation, in order to improve the quality of teaching, the level of scientific research, personnel performance.