官员更替、产权性质与企业避税

Official Substitution,Nature of Property Right and Enterprises Tax Avoidance

国内外文献考察了企业政治关联产生的避税效应,但是这些研究忽略了宏观政治环境变化对企业避税活动的影响。本文着眼于宏观政治环境与企业避税活动之间的关系,以2003-2011年A股上市公司为样本,并比较这一关系在国有上市公司与民营上市公司之间的差异。结果发现,官员更替将显著减弱企业避税,且这一负向影响在法制环境较好的地区更弱。分样本检验的结果显示,对于民营上市公司而言,法制环境的改善将减弱官员更替与企业避税之间的负向关系,且相比于本地升迁官员,外地调任官员的官员更替对企业避税的负向影响更显著;上述影响差异对国有上市公司而言并不存在。文章排除了官员更替通过"信贷扩张"和"税收竞争"等可能途径对企业避税的影响。本文不仅提供了市级官员更替影响企业避税活动的经验证据,也对当前税收征管改革提供了有益借鉴。

Previous literatures have studied the tax avoidance caused by enterprises political connections,but they neglect the impacts of macro political environment changes on enterprises tax avoidance. This article looks into the relation between macro political environment changes and enterprises tax avoidance with the sample of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2011,and compares the differences in the relationship between state-owned listed companies and private listed companies. The results suggest that official substitution has significantly negative effect on enterprises tax avoidance,and the better the legal environment,the weaker the effect. The results of the sub-sample tests show that,for private listed companies,the improvement of legal environment weakens the negative relationship between official substitution and enterprises tax avoidance. Compared with the new official from local city,the negative effect of the new official substitution from other cities is more distinct on enterprises tax avoidance. Meanwhile,the effect differences mentioned above do not exist in state-owned listed companies. The paper also eliminates the possible effect of official substitution on enterprises tax avoidance through the channels of ' credit expansion' and ' tax competition'. It not only provides empirical evidence for the effect of city- level official substitution on enterprises tax avoidance,but also sheds lights on the reform of tax collection and management.