部门容忍洗钱动机研究——基于非法产品供需均衡的视角

Research on Sectors-Incentive to Tolerate Money Laundering Based on the Supply-Demand Equilibrium of Criminal Products

"风险为本"已经成为国际反洗钱监管的趋势和方向。洗钱风险的识别是实施"风险为本"反洗钱监管的基础。洗钱风险与各部门容忍洗钱动机密切相关,越倾向于容忍洗钱的部门,其潜在的洗钱风险就越大。因此,部门容忍洗钱动机和部门洗钱风险之间有着正向的变动关系。然而,各部门容忍洗钱动机存在差异性,这种差异性导致打破问责链条的部门不断出现,使洗钱行为一直存在。只有减少这种差异性,反洗钱才能有效开展。本文用容忍洗钱动机刻画洗钱风险,构建了一个非法产品供需的局部均衡模型,研究部门容忍洗钱动机的差异性。研究结果表明,部门容忍洗钱动机的差异性和部门类型、部门规模、犯罪监管强度、部门对非法产品的需求偏好等因素有关。

'Risk-Based'has been the direction of international money-laundering regulation. Identifying money-laundering risks is the foundation for the implementation of the 'Risk-Based ' money-laundering regulation. Money-laundering risks are closely related to the sectors-incentive to tolerate money laundering.And more toleration means more risks. So the toleration and the risks are positively related. Otherwise,the incentive to tolerate money laundering differs from sector to sector,and these differences usually cause the occurrence of the sectors who break the 'the chain of accountability',which makes money laundering always exit. This paper builds a partial equilibrium model of criminal products' supply and demand,and describes money-laundering risks with sectors ' incentive to tolerate money laundering,to analyze the differences to tolerate money laundering between sectors. The conclusion is,the differences are related to the sector type,sector scale,crime regulation and the preference to criminal products of sectors.