住房公积金管理体系存在的问题及对策建议——基于委托代理关系视角

Problems and Countermeasures of Housing Provident Fund Management System——In Perspective of Mandate Relationship

运用新制度经济学中的委托代理理论,分析了现在我国住房公积金制度中的委托代理关系,揭示了现在我国住房公积金管理体系中存在的问题:地方政府的多目标影响了代理人职能的行使,管理中心的运行没有明确的目标导向、激励机制和风险分担机制,公积金管理委员会决策的民主性、合理性、权威性受到质疑,多方监管机构参与可能导致监督中的责权不明、效率低下,对代理银行的业务代理缺乏有效的激励约束机制。应重新构建住房公积金委托代理关系的架构:将公积金管理委员会的决策权划归管理中心,以缩短委托代理关系;建立垂直管理的住房公积金管理机构体系;健全缴存人与公积金管理中心之间的委托代理关系;健全政府和监督机构之间有效的委托代理机制;健全公积金管理中心和代理银行之间的委托代理关系。

Currently,the multi purposes existing in the local government in the housing provident fund management system in our country have affected the functions of the agent. The management center fails to define clearly the target orientation in its operation,incentive mechanism and risk sharing mechanism. The democracy,rationality and authority of the provident fund management committee is doubted in its decision making. Excessive participation of many regulators may cause unclear liability of supervision and low efficiency and so on. Based on the principal-agent theory of the new institutional economics,this paper puts forward the creation of the principal-agent relationship of the housing provident fund. That is to say,the decision-making power should be entrusted to the management committee so as to shorten the principal-agent relationship; a vertical management system of housing accumulation fund management should be established so as to improve the principal-agent relationship between the depositors and the provident fund management center,between the government and supervising institutes,and between the accumulation fund management center and the agent bank.