摘要
本文从"利维坦"假说出发,对财政分权和地方政府规模之间的内在关系进行分析,选取1997-2012年中国31个省市面板数据进行空间计量检验。结果表明:中国财政分权和地方政府规模均表现出较强的空间集聚效应,并有不断增强的趋势,同质政府财政竞争激励且重点在支出一端;控制空间效应后,财政分权对地方政府总规模具有显著地抑制效应,"利维坦"假说在中国省级层面得到验证,财政自主性拉大了地方政府规模,转移支付的"粘蝇纸效应"、软预算约束问题明显;不同类型地方政府规模对财政分权的反应差异明显,预算内和预算外规模对财政分权和财政自主性的反应完全相反。
Based on the ＂ Leviathan＂ hypothesis,this paper analyzes the inherent relationship between fiscal decentralization and local government size,and tests it with spatial econometrics methods based on 1997-2012China＇s 31 provinces panel data.The results show that Chinese fiscal decentralization and local government size show strong and growing spatial clustering effect,and homogeneous governments conduct fierce finances competition and they focuse on expenditure;after controlling the spatial effect,fiscal decentralization has a significant inhibitory effect on local government total size,and ＂ Leviathan＂ hypothesis has been verified in the Chinese provincial level.The finances autonomy widens local government size,transfer payments＇ ＂flypaper effect＂ and soft budget constraint problem are obvious;different types of local government size react to fiscal decentralization differently,and budgetary and extra-budgetary local government size react to fiscal decentralization and fiscal autonomy conversely.
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第7期34-44,共11页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
中央高校基本科研重大项目(SWU1309369)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(SWU1209442)
关键词
财政分权
地方政府规模
“利维坦”假说
空间效应
Fiscal Decentralization
Local Government Size
＂Leviathan＂hypothesis
Spatial Effects
