摘要
在当代心灵哲学中占据统治地位的功能主义又以两种方式隶属于物理主义,即非还原的物理主义和还原的物理主义,金在权属于后者。金在权一方面指出非还原的物理主义在理论上的不协调性,另一方面承认还原的物理主义在感受性问题上遭受挫折,退而主张有条件的或局部的物理主义,即"接近充足的物理主义"。然而,感受性对于心理性质而言具有某种普遍性,物理主义在感受性问题上的败退意味着大规模败退,远非金在权所说的"接近充足"。
Functionalism,that occupies a dominant position in contemporary philosophy of mind,is subordinate to physicalism in two different ways:non-reductive physicalism and reductive physicalism.Kim belongs to the latter.On the one hand,Kim reveals the inconsistency in non-reductive physicalism;on the other hand,he admits the defeat of reductive physicalism on the problem of qualia,and makes a concession to the standpoint of conditional physicalism,i.e.,physicalism as something near enough.However,qualia has a certain universality for mental properties,and thus the physicalism 's defeat at the problem of qualia is large-scale rather than "some thing near enough" as Kim claims.
出处
《哲学分析》
2015年第4期109-120,共12页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社科基金项目(项目编号:10BZX020)
广东省社会科学"十一五"规划项目(项目编号:09C-01)
中国逻辑学会学术研究重点项目(项目编号:13CLZD001)资助
关键词
心灵哲学
感受性问题
物理主义
功能主义
金在权
philosophy of mind
the problem of qualia
physicalism
functionalism
Jaegwon Kim