期刊文献+

货币政策传导、制度背景与企业资本投资 被引量:2

Monetary policy transmissions,system background and enterprise capital investment
下载PDF
导出
摘要 宏观经济政策通过不同渠道影响微观经济行为,而这些影响在不同制度背景下又具有显著差异。文章利用面板向量自回归技术,研究了不同制度背景下,货币政策传导的货币渠道和信贷渠道对企业资本投资的影响。结果显示:两类货币政策传导渠道均与资本投资正相关;相对于民营企业而言,国有企业资本投资对两类货币政策传导渠道均更具敏感性;货币渠道对金融发展水平较高地区的企业的正向影响更强;而信贷渠道对金融发展水平较低地区的企业的正向影响更强。研究结果为政府制定货币政策、提高宏观调控效率提供了一定依据。 Macroeconomic policies affect microeconomic behavior through different channels, and these influences have significant differences under the different background of systems. With the panel vector auto regression technique, this paper studies the monetary channel and credit channel of monetary policy transmission effects on corporate capital investment under the different system background. The result shows: the two kinds of monetary policy transmission channels are positively related to the capital investment. Compared to the private enterprise, state-owned enterprise capital investment is more sensitive to two types of monetary policy transmission channels. Monetary channel has a stronger positive influence on higher level of financial development region enterprises. And the credit channel has a stronger enterprises. The results of the study could improve pos the itive influence on low level of financial development region efficiency of macroeconomic regulation.
出处 《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第4期47-58,共12页 Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71172082 70902030) 教育部人文社会科学基金项目(11XJC790015 13YJC630087) 中央高校基本科研业务费重庆大学创新基金项目(CDJXS12020020)
关键词 货币政策传导渠道 产权性质 金融发展 资本投资 monetary policy transmission channels government ownership financial development capital investment
  • 相关文献

参考文献30

二级参考文献336

共引文献5744

同被引文献30

  • 1LI H Y, ZHANG Y. The role of managerial political networking and functional experience in new venture performance : Evidence from China's transition economy [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2007, 28(4): 791 - 804.
  • 2FACCIO M, MASULIS R W. Political connections and corporate bailouts [ J ]. The Journal of Finance, 2006, 61 (6) : 2597 -2635.
  • 3FACCIO M. Differences between politically connected and non-connected firms: A cross country analysis [ J ]. Financial Management, 2010, 39(3): 905-928.
  • 4GOLDMAN, EITAN. Do politically connected boards affect firm value [ J ]. Review of Financial Studies, 2009, 22 (6) : 2331 - 2360.
  • 5MICHAEL C, GULEN. Corporate political contributions and stock returns [ J]. Journal of Finance, 2010, 65 (2) : 687 - 724.
  • 6LIN H B. Why do entrepreneurs enter politics? Evidence from China [ J]. Economic Inquiry, 2006, 44(3) : 559 - 578.
  • 7CLAESSENS. Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 88 (3) : 554 - 580.
  • 8SAPIENZA P. The Effect of Governance Ownership on Bank Lending [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2004, 72(2) : 357 - 384.
  • 9KHWAJA A, MIAN A. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market [ J ]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, 120(4) : 401 - 411.
  • 10CHARUMILIND C, KALI R. Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis [J]. Journal of Business, 2007, 79(1) : 181- 217.

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部