公司政治治理能抑制大股东掏空行为吗

Can Political Governance Deter the Tunneling of Large Shareholders

以中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验公司政治治理对抑制大股东掏空行为的有效性,以及这种有效性如何因政府干预和财务风险的不同而发生改变。研究结果表明:在中国新兴加转轨的特殊制度背景下,公司政治治理这一制度安排,形成一种制度压力,能有效地抑制大股东掏空行为;公司政治治理对大股东掏空行为的治理效应随政府干预水平和财务风险大小的不同而变化,政府干预水平越高,财务风险越小,公司政治治理效应越好。研究结论有助于从公司政治治理层面理解大股东掏空行为,为政府部门监管上市公司大股东、保护中小股东利益提供直接的微观证据和参考价值,同时也为上市公司治理及企业党建工作的开展提供有益参考。

We examine the impacts of political governance on the tunneling of large shareholders in Chinese stock market. We make the following conclusions. First, corporate political governance can reduce the fund embezzlement of large shareholders from the listed companies. Second, government intervention strengthen the effect of political governance, however, the threat of financial risk weaken the effect of political governance on tunneling. The conclusion of this article will help us understand the effect of political governance on tunneling of large shareholders, and provide some microscopic evidence and reference value to protect the interests of the minority shareholders.