马克思与海德格尔思想中的“物”、“事物”和“物化”

Ding,Sache and Verdinglichung in Marx and Heidegger

"物化"是马克思主义政治经济学批判的中心概念。20世纪的社会批判理论对这个词的解释极为不同。当卢卡奇将物化解释为一种意识状态时,法兰克福学派使用这个词进行纯粹的理性批判。从戈德曼开始,许多学者坚持认为,通过物化概念来衔接马克思与胡塞尔、海德格尔等人的社会本体论。当然,在这个方面,海德格尔式的马克思主义有两个资源:批判理论的方法建立在法兰克福学派的遗产的基础上,而技术方法则从马克思和海德格尔的角度对技术和物化做出了不同的解释。本文认为,任何试图在物化问题上,将马克思与海德格尔合并起来的企图都会失败,这是因为其所使用的术语,以及由于科学研究、哲学的社会地位以及政治-意识形态的世界观的特殊视域所导致的。

Reification is one of the central concepts in Marxist critique of political economy. Critical social theories of the twentieth century interpreted this term differently. While Lukrcs focused on reification as a state of consciousness, the Frankfurt School made use of the term for a pure critique of reason. Starting from Goldman, many scholars insist on bridging Marx with other social ontologies such as of Husserl and Heidegger via reification concept. There are certainly two sources for a Heideggerian Marxism in this regard ： the critical theory approach based on the legacy of the Frankfurt School, and the technological approach that offers a diverse reinterpretation of technology and reification from Marx＇ s and Heidegger＇ s point of view. In this essay, I will argue that any attempt to use, the amalgamate Marx with Heidegger with regard to reification fails due to the terminology in particular vision of scientific research, the social role of philosophy, and the political-ideological world view.