战略联盟的控制机制对联盟绩效的影响研究——基于边界困境的视角

The Impacts of Control Mechanism in Strategic Alliance on Alliance Performance: from the Perspective of Boundary Dilemma

从解决战略联盟中的"边界困境"问题出发,考察了战略联盟的控制机制对联盟协调效率和投机风险的影响,并检验了协调效率和投机风险对联盟成员绩效的不同影响。实证结果显示,正式的契约控制可以有效解决"边界困境"中的投机风险问题,从而提升联盟成员绩效;而非正式的社会控制包括关系控制和信息控制可以有效解决"边界困境"中的协调效率问题,从而提升联盟成员绩效。这进一步丰富和扩展了当前的战略联盟管理文献,为战略联盟成员解决联盟"边界困境"并提升联盟合作绩效提供了重要的实证证据和理论支撑。

In order to solve the problem of boundary dilemma in the strategic alliance, this paper firstly examines the impact of the control mechanism in the strategic alliance on the coordinative efficiency and speculative risks of the alliance, and then it tests the different impacts of coordinative efficiency and speculative risks on the performances of the alliance members. The empirical results indicate that the formal contract control can efficiently resolve the problem of speculative risks in the boundary dilemma, so as to improve the performances of the alliance members; whereas the informal social control including relation control and information control can efficiently solve the problem of coordinative efficiency in the boundary dilemma, so as to improve the performance of the alliance members. These findings can enrich and extend the present literatures in strategic alliance management and provide significant empirical evidences and theoretical supports to the strategic alliance members to resolve boundary dilemma and further enhance alliance cooperative performance.