地方政府权力清单构建中的演化博弈行为——面向压力、竞争与回应条件的探索

Evolutionary Game Behavior in Building Lists of Local Government Power——Exploration for the Conditions of Pressure,Competition and Response

在本文对典型案例的收集、编码后发现,权力清单构建中地方政府与既得利益者的博弈是普遍存在的。通过挖掘博弈主体的约束条件及策略选择,构建了演化博弈模型并对策略稳定性进行了分析。研究发现:在博弈过程中,地方政府受到压力、竞争与回应3种约束,而既得利益者依据是否存在成本做出策略选择;当推行权力清单的动力大于阻力时,地方政府趋向选择"推行"。基于此,建议上级政府应对地方政府推行权力清单制度施加一定压力;引导同级政府间的良性竞争;培育社会力量,促使政府重视公民诉求;提高既得利益者阻止权力清单的成本。

This paper collects, codeds typical cases and finds that the game of local government and vested interests is widespread in building power lists. By digging game mains constraints and strategies, it builds the evolutionary game model and analyzes the evolution of policy stability. The study finds that： In the course of the game, local governments are bound by pre- ssure, competition and response, and vestes interests make a policy choice based on the existence of costs. When the power is greater than the resistance to implement power lists, local governments tends to select the ＂implementation＂. Based on these findings, this paper presents the following policy recommendations in four areas, including superiors shou]d exert some pressure on the local government, etc.