摘要
在制造商主导的二层供应链框架下,考察零售商的公平偏好对于促销努力水平和供应链运作效率的影响,并设计一个基于Nash讨价还价博弈的收益共享契约作为供应链协调机制.研究发现:1)在缺乏协调机制时,制造商可以通过降低批发价格,来维持零售商具有公平偏好的促销努力水平与公平中性时相等;2)零售商的公平偏好有利于提高自身的效用水平,但会降低制造商和供应链整体的效用水平;3)合理的收益共享契约可以实现双方效用水平Pareto改进,改善供应链运作效率.最后用数值仿真验证了该收益共享契约作为协调机制的可行性.
This paper investigates the influence of fairness preference on the promotion effort and supply chain' efficiency in the two-stage supply chain where the manufacture is the leader. A revenue sharing contract based on Nash bargaining model is designed to coordinate the whole supply chain. The results show that: 1) When the absence of coordination mechanism, the manufacture has to reduce the wholesale price to ensure the same promotion effort level considering the retailers fairness preference; 2) The retailer' fairness preference can improve its utility level, but will reduce the utility level of manufacturer and the whole supply chain; 3) The reasonable revenue sharing contract can lead to a Pareto improvement of the efficiency of the whole supply chain. Finally, the numerical simulation is performed to prove the feasibility of the revenue sharing contract as a coordination mechanism.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第9期2271-2279,共9页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71371086)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71101032)
江南大学自主科研计划重点项目(JUSRP51416B)
关键词
供应链管理
促销努力
公平偏好
Nash讨价还价博弈
协调机制
supply chain management
promotional effort
fairness preference
Nash bargaining
coordination mechanism