考虑零售商公平偏好的促销努力激励机制设计

The incentive mechanism design for promotion effort considering the retailer's fairness preference

在制造商主导的二层供应链框架下,考察零售商的公平偏好对于促销努力水平和供应链运作效率的影响,并设计一个基于Nash讨价还价博弈的收益共享契约作为供应链协调机制.研究发现:1)在缺乏协调机制时,制造商可以通过降低批发价格,来维持零售商具有公平偏好的促销努力水平与公平中性时相等;2)零售商的公平偏好有利于提高自身的效用水平,但会降低制造商和供应链整体的效用水平;3)合理的收益共享契约可以实现双方效用水平Pareto改进,改善供应链运作效率.最后用数值仿真验证了该收益共享契约作为协调机制的可行性.

This paper investigates the influence of fairness preference on the promotion effort and supply chain＇ efficiency in the two-stage supply chain where the manufacture is the leader. A revenue sharing contract based on Nash bargaining model is designed to coordinate the whole supply chain. The results show that： 1） When the absence of coordination mechanism, the manufacture has to reduce the wholesale price to ensure the same promotion effort level considering the retailers fairness preference; 2） The retailer＇ fairness preference can improve its utility level, but will reduce the utility level of manufacturer and the whole supply chain; 3） The reasonable revenue sharing contract can lead to a Pareto improvement of the efficiency of the whole supply chain. Finally, the numerical simulation is performed to prove the feasibility of the revenue sharing contract as a coordination mechanism.