产品侵权下的法律制度与声誉成本权衡——一个微观模型补充

Product Tort,the Cost Tradeoff between Law and Reputation——A Microeconomics Model Supplement

在信息不对称的体验品市场中,非正式的声誉机制和正式的侵权法律制度能够激励生产具有潜在危害产品的厂商事前增加在产品质量安全方面的投资,但声誉机制面临"时间成本"的质疑,侵权产品责任制则面临由于高诉讼成本与低诉讼率导致法律执行效率低的质疑。本文基于声誉调整遵循过去声誉和现时质量的马尔科夫过程假定,将声誉和产品责任制放入同一个基础模型框架中,探讨产品质量和声誉积累的动态演变过程及产品责任制和声誉积累之间的关系,得出了以下补充性结论:如果在一定条件下存在一个质量一声誉鞍点稳定均衡,且严格产品责任制能够有效地降低声誉机制的"时间成本",那么,在产品责任制和声誉机制共同作用下的均衡质量水平比无产品责任制时高,同时侵权法律制度可以提高均衡路径上厂商非正式声誉机制的执行效率。

In the experience product market with information asymmetry, the informal reputation mechanism and formal legal system can provide the manufacture which products with potential harm. But the reputation mechanism is challenged of high ＇ time cost＇ , and the product liability is challenged with high litigation costs and low litigation rate. This paper explores the interaction between reputation and product liability with the assumption that the reputation adjustment evolves a Markovian process of past reputation and the present quality produced. Three conclusions arc derived. First, there is a quality-reputation saddle point equilibrium based on the assumptions. Second, the strict product liability can reduce the reputational costs. Third, the equilibrium level of quality and reputation under strict liability are higher than that without product liability law.