要素产权与法权耦合视角下的劳资关系演进与均衡

On the Equilibrium of Industrial Relations–from the Perspective of Property Rights and Legal Rights

劳资关系的发展经历了三个不同质的阶段,劳资主体双方在人力资本投资和劳动努力程度方面的目标差异是劳资冲突的内在根源。劳资关系均衡实质是特定的法权体系下要素产权投资所达到的稳态,劳资关系的均衡依存于物质资本、人力资本和劳动努力水平三方面的产权投资状况。劳资要素的法权和产权共同影响劳资关系的状态。当要素法权对产权进行完整保护并且劳动者拥有充分的谈判力时,劳资要素之间冲突最小从而达到最优均衡。此时劳资要素主客体之间分别在价值层面与技术层面呈现和谐状态。

This paper analyzes the evolution of industrial relations logically from the perspective of property rights and legal rights, finding that the development of labor relations has gone through three essentially different stages and the conflict between capital and labor roots from the difference between their goals concerning human capital investment and labor endeavor. Moreover, the equilibrium of industrial relations refers to the steady state of production factors＇ property investment under certain legal systems, including physical capital investment, human capital investment and labor endeavor. The basic conclusion of this paper is that the equilibrium of industrial relations is determined by both property rights and legal rights of the two factors. Furthermore, only when the legal system completely protects the property rights of both capital and labor and endows labor with absolute bargaining power, could the conflict between labor and capital be minimized and the industrial relations reach the optimal equilibrium. The policy implication of this paper is that the government should set the goal of achieving optimal equilibrium as the ultimate aim of its regulation on industrial relations. Specifically, the government should try to fully protect labor property rights, improve the outside option and property strength of labor, and narrow the difference of the goals between capital and labor by balancing their strength and increasing human capital investment.