分利行为、舆论监督与政府治理:内生政府治理机制

Endogenous Governance Structure of Authoritarian Government

本文考察了不同政府治理机制对于规制下级政府资源配置的不同效果。当资源配置信息难以证实时,拥有资源配置权的下级政府可能会为了私人利益而扭曲资源配置,从而拉大了社会收入差距,增加了社会治理成本。在以"官员监督官员"的政府内部治理机制下,由于监督者较易被下级政府俘获、权力庇护的存在以及监督效率的低下,其治理常失效。而以"舆论监督官员"的外部治理可较好规避上述不利情况,这使得外部治理成为中央政府的一个合意选择。这也为威权体制下政府选择性地开放媒体提供了一个解释。

When information asymmetry right of resources allocation are incentivized to is binding, local government agents who own act in the best of their private benefit by misallocating resources. We investigate different governance mechanisms which shape local government agents＇ behaviors of resources allocation. But internal monitoring governance mechanism always fail the task for ＂capture＂ effects of monitors, political patronage and inefficient monitoring. On the other hand, the external governance mechanism, normally taking a form of media monitoring, may achieve the objective of cost-saving under certain circumstances. We thus provide a rationale for the loosening of media control in the authoritarian regime.