论警察权力寻租性腐败的产生及其制约

Emergence and Restriction of Rent- Seeking Corruption:Based on the example of Rent- Seeking Police Power

权力具有公共性,但公权力的运行往往会偏离公共利益这个目标,演变成权力行使主体谋取私利的工具,导致寻租性腐败的产生。按照现代的寻租理论,通过对警察权力1寻租实例的解析发现,只要影响到资源配置的政府干预存在,就会有经济租金的产生;只要有经济租金的存在,权力寻租行为的发生就不可避免。因此,对权力寻租的防治应当从减少不必要的行政干预、引入市场竞争机制、控制租金的产生等方面采取相应的对策。

Public power is not exclusive. However, the execution of public power usually departs the goal of public interest, evolves into a tool for self - interest and causes the emergence of rent - seeking corruption. Based on the modem theory of rent - seeking, and through analysis of cases on rent - seeking police power, the result shows： only if the government executes intervention and affects the allocation of resources, can it produce economic rent. Additionally, only with economic rent＇s existence, rent -seeking power can happen. Thus, the governance of power rent - seeking should limits the unnecessary administrative intervention, intro- duces the mechanism of marketing and competition, controls the emergence of rent and adopts corresponding responses in other aspects.