相得益彰抑或掩人耳目:盈余操纵与MD&A中非财务信息披露

A Supplement or Another Lie: Earnings Manipulation and Non- financial Information Disclosure in MD&A

本文以2007-2012年之间的盈余重述公司为样本,研究了高管是否利用管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)中非财务信息来为其盈余操纵行为做掩盖。研究发现,非财务信息披露的一个动机是为了隐藏盈余操纵,在隐藏期间(被重述年度与重述年度之间),进行盈余重述的公司会披露更多的MD&A中非财务信息。进一步,我们发现盈余操纵与MD&A中非财务信息披露的关系在隐藏动机较大(例如有股权激励)的公司当中更强,由此验证了我们的隐藏动机假说。本文提供了一个策略性的进行非财务信息披露的情景,补充了有关信息披露动机的文献。本文提请投资者更加清晰的辨别非财务信息和盈余信息;也提请监管层能够更加严格的监管信息披露,尤其是非财务信息披露。

Based on a sample of earnings restatement companies,this paper examines whether executives use non- financial information to conceal their earning manipulation behavior. We find the restatement companies disclose more non- financial information in the hiding period andthis suggests that executives use non- financial information cover up their manipulation behaviors. Further we find the relation between earning manipulation and non- financial information is stronger in the companies with equity- based incentive. This paper provides a setting in which the executives disclose non- financial information strategically,extending the research about information disclosure motivation. This paper helps investors more clearly distinguish the authenticity of financial and non- financial information and make regulators more strictly supervise information disclosure,especially non- financial information.