高管权力、薪酬激励与内部控制——基于中国制造业上市公司的实证研究

Analysis of the Relation Among the Executive Power,Salary Incentives and Internal Control——Based on the Empirical Research of Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

以2013年沪深A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,从高管权力视角实证检验了高管薪酬对企业内部控制的影响。实证结果表明:1)薪酬激励有助于提高企业内部控制的有效性;2)高管权力影响薪酬的激励效应,随着高管权力的增大,薪酬激励对企业内部控制的提升作用受到抑制;3)高管权力对薪酬激励和内部控制之间关系的抑制作用受制于企业最终控制人的性质的影响,国有企业高管薪酬与内部控制之间的关系比非国有企业更易受到高管权力的影响。要提高企业内部控制的有效性,仅仅提高高管薪酬并不是最优选择,需要从高管权力的制约角度来考虑。

With A-share listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2013 as the sample, this paper ex- amines the influence of executive compensation on the enterprises＇ internal control from the perspective of executive power. The results of the empirical research shows that ： 1 ） Salary incentives benefits the improvement of the efficiency of compa- nies＇ internal control;2） The executive power influences the incentive effects of salary. With the increase of executive pow- er, the compensation incentive is inhibited from enhancing companies＇ s internal control; 3）The executive power＇ s inhibi- tion on the relation between salary incentives and internal control is influenced by the property of enterprise＇ s ultimate con- troller. State- owned enterprises are easier influenced by the executive power than non state -owned companies. There- fore, to improve the efficiency of enterprises＇ internal control, only improving the executive compensation is not the optimal choice, and it is necessary to take the restriction of the executive power into consideration.