摘要
文章针对高校科研团队中有大量学生参与研究的现状,从激励收益和成本的角度,构建了高校科研团队内学生隐性知识共享的激励模型,分析了目前高校在学生隐性知识共享激励机制方面的不足,并提出改进为线性的激励机制。通过定量分析,新机制在信息对称的条件下能够使学生的隐性知识共享努力水平实现帕累托最优。
According to the status that there are a lot of students participating university scientific research teams, this pa- per formulates an incentive model of the students' tacit knowledge sharing levels in terms of the incentive income and cost. By analyzing the deficiency of the current incentive mechanism, this paper proposes to use the linear incentive mechanism to replace the existing mechanism. The quantitative analysis shows the linear incentive mechanism can make students' tacit knowledge sharing levels realize the Pareto Optimality under the condition of symmetry information.
出处
《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2015年第5期459-463,共5页
Journal of Tianjin University:Social Sciences
基金
天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(2011ZX02)
天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(2013ZX01)
关键词
科研团队
隐性知识
博弈论
激励机制
scientific research team
tacit knowledge
game theory
incentive mechanism