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意识“困难问题”的消解及超越 被引量:1

Dissolution of the “Hard Problem”of Consciousness and Its Transcendence
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摘要 意识的"困难问题"是物理主义立场中对待现象意识的提法。它投射出了物理主义的困境,即过分地追求事实以至于忽视了宏观的现象世界与人的整体生活。虽然物理主义者从意识的"困难问题"看到了物理主义的缺憾,但由于他们堕于物理主义世界观之中无法突破事实性研究的框架,因此,这种内部超越终究失败于一时。而随着意识研究的深入,所谓的意识"困难问题"必将因其背后隐含的深层问题的提出而消解。这些深层的问题包括:意识的主观性问题,物理主义还原手段的本质,以及意识研究的应然范式等。而意识"困难问题"所代表的物理主义立场将被重新定位,从而实现对自己的真正超越。 The "hard problem" of consciousness is a phrase which is advanced to indicate the qualia or the subjective character of experience from the materialistic point of view. Such a phrase implicates the predicament of materialism which loses the sight of macroscopic phenomenological world or the whole human life for its over-pursuing of the reality. Materialists have realized the defect of materialism, but still fail to make a breakthrough of the fact-aiming research program for their immersion in materialistic worldview. Therefore, the transcending try from within materialism is thought abortive up to the present time. As the research on consciousness proceeds, the alleged "hard problem" of consciousness must necessarily be dissolved to the essential problems in it, such as the subjectivity of consciousness, the nature of reductionism, and the ideal means for consciousness research, etc. Materialism needs to be revalued and find a new point of view to transcend itself.
作者 李莉莉
出处 《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期70-74,共5页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
关键词 意识的“困难问题” 现象意识 感受性质 物理主义 "hard problem" of consciousness phenomenal consciousness qualia materialism
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参考文献18

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