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霸权与制度:美国如何操控地区开发银行 被引量:25

Power Versus Institution:How Does the United States Manipulate and Control Regional Development Banks?
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摘要 为什么有的多边援助机构在很大程度上沦为大国实现其利益的工具,而另一些机构则保持了较高的相对自主性?作者选取美洲开发银行、非洲开发银行、亚洲开发银行和欧洲复兴开发银行四个地区援助机构,考察并解释美国对这些地区开发银行操控程度的差异及其原因,并以统计方法研究地区开发银行在选择受援方以及决定援助额度分配等重要决策上与美国政策偏好和利益的契合程度,从而对美国在四个地区开发银行中的操控进行程度排序。在此基础上,根据委托一代理、制度理论和政治联盟理论,提出影响操控程度差异的四个解释因素,即地区开发机构所属地缘区域和业务范围与美国利益的攸关性、美国是否主导机构创立、机构的决策权力分散程度和行政官僚机构复杂程度以及美国在机构中是否有足够多的可靠盟友来建立获胜联盟。作者通过比较案例分析,逐一对理论假设进行检验。这一研究对建立并维护新的地区开发银行的独立性具有一定政策启发意义。 Regional development banks play important roles in global governance of international development aid,and preservation of the autonomy and independence of regional development institutions is crucial to improve the efficacy of development aid.This paper is intended to investigate the question of why some multilateral development institutions are more vulnerable to the manipulation and control of great powers than others.The paper focuses on four regional banks,namely,the Inter-American Development Bank(IADB),the African Development Bank(AfDB),the Asian Development Bank(ADB),the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development(EBRD),and statistically measures the variation of how successfully the United States influences important aid decisions in these banks.The paper goes further to explain why the United States controls IADB and ADB much more tighdy than AfDB and EBRD.Based on the Principle-Agent Theory,Institutional Theory,and Political Coalition Theory,the present research suggests four important explanatory variables which affect the America's control of these regional development banks,including whether the bank is directly related to American geopolitical interests,whether the United States dominates the institution-creating process of the bank,whether the bank's voting power is highly concentrated and bureaucratic body is permeable,and how easily the United States can form a winning coalition in the bank by relying on its loyal allies.Large quantitative analysis and comparative case studies are used to test the hypotheses,and empirical evidence supports the proposed theory.The implications of the findings in the present research are important for global governance of international development aid and the establishment of new multilateral development institutions initiated and led by emerging economies.
作者 庞殉 何枻焜
出处 《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第9期4-30,共27页 World Economics and Politics
基金 教育部人文社科基金青年项目“金砖国家对外发展援助的战略模式与合作前景”(项目编号:12YJCGJW009)的阶段性成果 清华大学自主科研计划(课题编号:2014z22071)的资助
关键词 多边援助 地区开发银行 委托-代理 制度 大国操控 multilateral aid regional development banks agent-principle institution power
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参考文献63

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