基于动态博弈的矿业投资政策风险研究

Study on the Policy Risk of Mining Investment based on Dynamic Game Model

在矿业市场中,地方政府既是矿业市场的管理者和监督者,也是独立的利益主体,与矿业投资者产生利益争夺,这就造成了政策上的不确定性,给矿业投资者带来政策风险,而投资者可采取的防范政策风险的对策非常有限。文章运用博弈论工具分析了地方政府与矿业投资者之间的相互作用,构建了动态博弈模型,探讨了不同类型的政府所选择的均衡策略,解释了管制型政府作为利益主体有积极性通过采取机会主义行为给矿山企业以较大的政策风险来获得好处这一事实。文章还提出了矿业投资者防范政策风险的一个基本对策,即安排客户、银行、保险公司以及其他权力部门等多方参与进来,并通过博弈模型对该对策进行了分析。最后对肯尼科特公司在经营智利铜矿中规避政策风险的案例进行了分析,通过实例证明了该对策的可行性和有效性。

In mining market, local government plays not only the role of administrator and supervisor, but also the role of independent interests subject in some cases. It brings out policies uncertainties and risks to mining investors. However, the countermeasures of investors are very limited. Based on the game theory approach, this paper analyzes the interactive relationship between local government and mining investors, builds a dynamic game model of complete information. By discussing the equilibrium strategies of various kinds of governments, it shows that regulatory government has incentives for taking opportunism behaviors and making benefits from investors. A basic countermeasure for the investors to prevent policy risks brought out by this paper is the arrangement of multilateral involvement, including clients, banks, insurance eompany and other state-sectors. Moreover, the countermeasure is analyzed by establishing a game model. Finally, the case of policy risks prevention by Kennecott Copper in Chile is discussed and the feasibility and effectiveness of the countermeasure are proved.