台湾地区“马王政争”的制度根源

Institutional Origin of Ma-Wang Dispute in Taiwan Province

在2013年9月,台湾地区最高领导人马英九欲逼迫立法机构负责人王金平去职,引爆了"马王政争"。这场政治角力的出现,和立法机构的法案通过率偏低,并往往搁置有争议的法案有关,这严重冲击了行政部门的施政效能。分析而言,立法机构的法案通过率偏低,是由两类制度的交互作用所导致,一是立法机构内部的立法审议规则,另一则是国民党的党政关系运作机制。在之前马英九担任党主席的时期,国民党的党政关系由行政挂帅,和立法机构内的党团关系疏离,因而党政关系运作机制无法有效连结立法与行政。虽然国民党占有立法机构多数席位,但在党团的漠视与被动之下,造成立法审议流程中的层层关卡无法突破,影响到行政部门法案的通过率,埋下"马王政争"的导火索。

In September 2013, Ma Ying-jeou, the leader of Taiwan province, wanted to force Wang Jin-pyng, the chairman of the parliament, to resign, which triggered the ＂Ma-Wang Dispute. ＂ This dispute was related to the inefficiency in the parliament, which affect the performance of the government. Analytically, the inefficiency in the parliament resulted from the interaction of two factors-the procedures of the parliament and the mechanisms of the party- government relationship of Kuomintang. When Ma Ying-jeou was the chairman of Kuomintang, the party-government relationship was dominated by the executive branch and kept a long distance with the party members in the parliament. Although Kuomintang was the majority party in the parliament, the party members were passive and the acts of the government were often obstructed by the procedures. This dilemma was the real cause for the ＂Ma-Wang Dispute. ＂