会计稳健性、管理层非预期持股与投资效率

Accounting Conservatism,Managerial Unexpected Ownership and Corporate Investment Efficiency

利用2000-2012年中国上市公司的数据,检验了会计稳健性、考虑投资机会集的管理层非预期持股行为对公司投资效率的影响。研究发现：会计稳健性能够抑制公司不合理的投资,促进公司投资效率的提高;管理层非预期持股能够产生利益协同作用,提高公司的投资效率;存在管理层非预期持股时,会计稳健性对公司投资效率的促进作用更大。

Using Chinese listed companies data in 2000-2012, this paper tries to find the impact of accounting conservatism on cor- porate investment efficiency, and also management shareholding＇ effect on corporate investment efficiency. The results show accounting conservatism can limit unreasonable investment and promote investing efficiency of companies. And managerial ownership can generate synergy effect, which also can improve corporate investing efficiency. What is more, when managerial ownership existing, the limitation effect on inefficiency investment of accounting conservatism will be bigger. Besides, the result show accounting conservatism also can limit the total investment of companies, and managerial ownership can also exert this effect on total investment.