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谁能成为明星CEO——管理者声誉的来源及影响 被引量:12

WHO WILL BE A STAR CEO——The Source and Influence of Managerial Reputation
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摘要 在中国,企业管理者为获取更丰厚的报酬和更好的职业生涯不只是通过企业的良好经营,同时很大一部分管理者也积极建立与政府的密切联系。本文从管理者政治关联的独特视角出发,研究了上市公司管理者声誉来源及其对企业短期股价和长期经营绩效的影响。基于2005—2012年上市公司的面板数据,本文采用倾向评分匹配的方法,有效解决了样本"内生性"问题。本文研究发现,国有企业管理者声誉的获取可能主要依赖于其政治关联的支持,而民营企业管理者声誉的取得可能主要依靠企业自身良好的经营绩效;同时管理者声誉在短期内对企业股价有显著的负向影响,但对企业的长期经营绩效确有显著的促进作用。本文为我国经理人劳动力市场的完善及国有企业市场化改革提供了新的经验证据。 In China, the way to get a rich reward and a better career for the enterprise managers is not only through the good operating results, the close contact with the government will be also virtual. Start- ing from the unique perspective of political association managers, this paper studies the source of the repu- tation and the short-term stock price and long-term performance of the enterprise. This paper uses the pro- pensity score matching method to solve the endogenous problem effectively, basing on the panel data of lis- ted companies from 2005 to 2012. This study finds that the managerial reputation of state-owned enterprise may mainly rely on its political connection support, and the managerial reputation of private enterprise may mainly base on their own good operating performance. Managerial reputation has a significant negative effect on its short-term stock price, while it has a significant positive effect on the long-term operating per- formance. This paper provides new empirical evidence for perfecting the labor market of managers and the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises.
出处 《经济理论与经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第9期86-100,共15页 Economic Theory and Business Management
基金 浙江省科技厅软科学计划项目(2014C35033)的资助
关键词 管理者声誉 政治关联 倾向评分匹配 来源 经营绩效 managerial reputation political connection propensity score matching source operating performance
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