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共享资源治理制度转型中个体规则认同与策略预期调整——基于南京住宅小区老旧电梯更新调查研究 被引量:11

A Study of Individual Rule-identity and Strategy-expectation in the Transition of Governing the Commons——Based on the Survey of Residential Community Elevator Replacement in Nanjing
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摘要 在一项特定制度运行或政策实施中,随着个体经历时间足够长,其偏好与信念也会发生与制度相对应的变化。当历经转型期,该项制度名义上发生变化,但却会引起个体认知调适危机——偏好和信念未能及时随制度转型做相应调整。本文便是基于制度与认知协同演化视角,采用个体偏好-策略预期框架,尝试以住宅小区共享资源治理为例,解释数十年的政府福利政策对于个体的公共政策偏好与预期的影响。通过对南京市35个典型住宅小区的调研数据,考察了共享资源治理制度转型中的规则认同(偏好)和策略预期状态及影响因素。结果显示:(1)目前"垂直行政权力支配"仍然是小区治理各方的主要规则认同,而新的"水平市场化协调"的规则认同正处于学习和适应过程中;(2)在上述适应过程中,个体依赖"政府解决"的策略预期降低,而"业主协商解决"策略预期有所提高;(3)福利政策照顾经历对个体规则认同与策略预期调整产生影响,以往经历中福利政策经历时间长、范围广及受特定福利政策照顾的个体,其持有的"垂直行政权力支配(政府应负责)"规则认同度显著高、持有的"业主协商解决"小区共享资源治理的策略预期显著低。 Abstract: As individuals live long enough in a specific policy regime, their preference and belief will change with the institution and regime correspondingly. During the transition, the change of the regime itself will cause individual cognitive adaptation crisis-preferences and beliefs fail to make the appropriate adjustments with institutional transformation. This paper focus on the feedback effect of specific regime and experience on preference and belief, especially, the effect of institution arrangement of government providing social service on the preference for public policy. Based on co-evolution of preference and institution perspective, this paper applies the individual prefer- ence-strategic expectation frame to understand the issues of common resources governance in residential community. The state and adjust- ment factors of rules-identity (preference) and strategy-expectation are investigated in the institutional transition of common resources governance by data acquisition and sample analysis in residential communities in Nanjing. The result shows that "vertical administrative power governing rules" is still the dominant rule-identity, while the new rule identity of "market level negotiation rule" is being learned and adjusted. In the adjustment process, individuals have low strategy-expectation on "solving by government", but the expectation on "solving by negotiation of property owners" is improved. Meanwhile, welfare care experience has effect on individuals rule identity and strategy-expectation. The individuals who experience a long time and wide range welfare regime and are cared by special administrative policy are more likely to have high rule identity of "government is responsive" while have low strategy-expectation on "solving by negotiation of property owners" in common resources governance in communities.
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第8期13-22,共10页 Management Review
基金 国家自然科学青年科学基金项目(71203145) 教育部人文社科基金项目(11YJA790077) 江苏省研究生科研创新计划项目(CXZZ13_0230)
关键词 共享资源 治理转型 规则认同(偏好) 策略预期 common pool resources, transition of governing the commons, rule identity ( rule preference) , strategy expectation
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参考文献20

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