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资本结构对并购支付方式的影响研究--基于我国资本市场背景的分析 被引量:18

The Effect of Capital Structure on the Method of Payment in Mergers & Acquisitions——Analysis Based on the Background of China's Capital Market
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摘要 资本结构与支付方式之间的关系是企业并购的核心问题。然而,已有的研究并未关注资本市场的阶段特征可能会影响资本结构与支付方式之间的关系,本文结合我国资本市场发展阶段特征,系统研究了资本结构对并购支付方式的影响。结论表明:杠杆赤字对支付方式具有显著的影响,杠杆赤字越高,并购中使用现金支付的可能性越小;杠杆赤字对支付方式的调节作用在市场低迷和高涨时期存在显著差异,称为"赤字择时效应",资本市场阶段特征对支付方式具有显著影响,称为"支付择时效应";最后,提出了研究结论的政策含义。本研究对于丰富企业并购领域的资本结构理论和形成新兴和转轨资本市场条件下的并购支付理论都具有重要价值,同时,也可以提高并购实践中企业支付方决策的科学化水平。 Abstract: The relationship between capital structure and the method of payment is a core issue in mergers and acquisitions. However, previous studies did not focus on the effect of features of the capital market stage on the relationship between capital structure and methods of payment. In this paper, we research the impact of capital structure on payment methods in the context of china' s capital market. The findings show that leverage deficit has a significant impact on the method of payment. That' s to say, the higher the leverage deficit, the smaller the possibility of mergers and acquisitions with the cash payment, which is defined as "deficit timing effects" in this paper. The role of leverage deficit on method of payment has a significant difference between market downturn and rising period, which is called "payment timing effect". Finally, we propose some policy implications of these research findings. The conclusions of this paper can contribute to capital structure theory in the field of mergers & acquisitions and payment theory in the emerging and transitional capital markets with Chinese characteristics, and also can improve the scientific level of corporate decision of payment.
作者 赵息 孙世攀
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第8期33-46,共14页 Management Review
基金 教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(11YJA630208) 山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2014GM006)
关键词 资本结构 企业并购 支付方式 capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, the method of payment
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