残缺合作博弈的L-核仁与I-Shapley值

The L-Nucleolus and I-Shapley Value for Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information

通过引入残缺合作博弈的相关定义,给出了验证其超可加性的有效模型.基于子联盟的超出值与平均超出值之间的离差最小化的博弈准则,定义了残缺合作博弈的L-核仁.构造了分配向量与正、负理想分配间的离差函数,提出了求解残缺合作博弈I-Shapley值的最优化模型,探讨了L-核仁与I-Shapley值的存在性与合理性.

Introducing the concerned definition of incomplete cooperative games, an effectivemodel to examine the superadditivity of the games was presented. Based on the criterion forminimizing the deviation of excess and expected excess value, the L-nucleolus was obtained.Constructing the deviation of imputation and ideal vectors, an optimizing program to derive I-Shapley value was also presented for the incomplete cooperative games. The existence andrationality of L-nucleolus and I-Shapley value were discussed.