摘要
否定性事实问题一方面与真理符合论紧密相关,另一方面又涉及到认知主体如何理解否定的问题,因而是逻辑哲学中的一个重要问题。罗素对这个问题有两种对立的观点。在逻辑原子主义时期,罗素认为没有否定性事实就无法解释肯定性假命题和否定性真命题,因此否定性事实是存在的。在转向中立一元论后,罗素将否定联结词转换为主体的认知状态,并认为包含"不"的判断语句的真值是由认知主体在一定条件下具有的感觉所确定,因此否定性事实并不存在。当代学者巴克和杰戈对否定性事实的存在性提出了新的论证,这为批判地看待罗素在否定性事实问题上的思想转变提供了新的视角。
Negative facts are closely related to the correspondence theory of truth, and involve a problem of how to understand the negation. It is an important theme in the philosophy of logic. Russell had two opposite views about negative facts. In the period of logical atomism, Russell contended that negative facts exist because, if there areno negative facts, we cannot explain true negative propositions and false positive proposition. After turning to neutral monism, Russell held that the truth of a negative judgment sentence is tested by the feeling of a cognitive subject and abandoned negative facts. Contemporary scholar Stephen Barker and Mark Jago put forward a new argument for the existence of the negative fact, which providesa new perspective to look into the change of Russell's position of negative facts critically.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期33-38,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
关键词
罗素
否定
否定性事实
否定谓词
逻辑原子主义
Russell
Negation
Negative facts: Negative 10redicate: Logical atomism