合约期内股权激励与内部控制有效性--基于股票期权和限制性股票的视角

Equity Incentive during the Period of Contract and Internal Control Effectiveness——Based on the perspective of stock options and restricted stock

本文从股票期权和限制性股票的视角,以2009—2013年深沪两市A股类上市公司为样本,探讨股权激励的实施以及合约期内的股权激励强度对内部控制有效性产生的影响。研究发现:股权激励的实施可以促进内部控制有效性水平的提高;股权激励强度与内部控制有效性间存在正U型关系,且这种关系在限制性股票支付方式下更显著,而在股票期权支付方式下并不存在;与国有上市公司相比,非国有上市公司股权激励的实施更能改善内部控制质量,且股权激励强度与内部控制有效性间存在显著的正U型关系,而在国有上市公司中并不存在。研究表明,股权激励是内部控制质量的影响因素之一,其设计合理可以缓解委托代理间冲突,反之,有可能会加剧冲突。

Based on the perspective of stock options and restricted stock ,taking 2009--2013 Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies as samples, this paper discusses how the implementation of equity incentives and the strength of equity incentives during the contract period affect the level of internal control effectiveness. The study finds that the implementation of equity incentive policy can promote the improvement of internal control effective- ness. It also finds that the relationship between the strength of equity incentives and internal control effectiveness is u-shaped, which is more significant in the pattern of restricted stock while it does not exist in the pattern of stock op- tion. Compared with state-owned listed companies, the implementation of equity incentive policy can better improve internal control effectiveness in non-state-owned listed companies. Furthermore the relationship between the strength of equity incentives and internal control effectiveness is significantly u-shaped. The study shows that, equity incen- tive is one of the most influencial factors of internal control effectiveness. If properly designed,it can relief the con- flicts with trusted agencies, on the contrary, it would worsen the problem.