财政分权、政府补助与企业过度投资——基于宏观视角与微观数据的实证分析

Fiscal Decentralization,Local Government Subsidies and Excessive Investment:Evidence from Macroscopic View and Microscopic Data

本文以财政分权改革影响地方政府行为的宏观视角作为切入点,利用2007-2013年沪深上市公司面板数据进行实证分析,探索财政分权程度、地方政府财政补贴与企业过度投资行为之间的关系,厘清宏观政策到微观行为的传导机制。研究发现:(1)首先利用人均指标衡量财政分权度,财政分权水平会正向促进财政补贴数额增加,进而导致企业过度投资;(2)另一方面财政分权的扩大同时增加了地方政府对社会建设的投入,有效改善了企业投资环境降低企业过度投资效应。

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the fiscal decentralization and local government subsidies by employing China＇s provincial panel data and capital market data, with a breakthrough point that the fiscal decentralization influences local government behaviors. This paper reaches two main conclusions： firstly, with per capita indicator, the higher degree of fiscal decentralization in a region, the more subsidies the local government provides for the companies; secondly, fiscal decentralization in a region downside the degree of company investment through improvement of social construction by local government invests.