摘要
查莫斯宣称,他的认知二维语义学承认克里普克的模态与意义理论,并分别从模态论证与认知论证两个方面论述了这一点。但是,认知二维语义学诉诸模态理性主义一元论,而该理论违背了克里普克对认知模态与形而上模态的划分;并且,如果认知内涵框架可以整合指称的因果机制,那么,认知内涵就应当是一种元语义成分。因此,认知二维语义学并未真正地完全接受克里普克的模态与意义理论。
Chalmers claimed that his epistemic two-dimensional semantics admitted Kripke's theories of modality and meaning, and argued for this from modal argument and epistemic argument respectively. However, what the epistemic two-dimensional semantics invokes to is modal rationalism monism, which violates the distinction between epistemic modality and metaphysical modality made by Kripke; and, if epistemic intension can integrate the causal mechanism of reference, then it will be metasemantical component. Therefore, it is not that epistemic two-dimensional semantics admits the theories of modality and meaning of Krioke really and comoletelv.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第10期3-7,共5页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词
认知二维语义学
认知模态
形而上模态
语义学
元语义学
epistemic two-dimensional semantics
epistemic modality
metaphysical modality
semantics
metasemantics