摘要
建立双寡头Bertrand序贯博弈模型,比较均衡时四种环境规制手段的厂商R&D激励大小。认为排污税和拍卖R&D激励最高,在异质产品市场上,使用简单排放标准比排污权交易更能激励企业从事环境研发投资,获得动态效率提升。在环境治理方式选择上,切忌政策"一刀切",要充分考虑市场结构、规制目标和需求函数等诸多因素影响。
This paper builds the Bertrand sequential game model and compares R＆D incentives of four environmental regu- lation instruments based on heterogeneity product. The basic conclusion is that auctioned permits and emission taxes offer the highest R＆D incentive among four regulation instruments ; command - and - control instrument has more dynamic effi- ciency than tradable permits under heterogeneity product market. Policy makers should avoid ＂one size fits all＂ when choo- sing environmental regulation instrument and consider fully the influence of market structure, regulation goal and demand function.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第19期233-239,共7页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目"基于演化博弈理论的皖江城市带集群式承接产业转移机理及对策研究"(AHSKY2014D58)
关键词
环境规制工具
R&D激励
动态效率
BERTRAND模型
产品异质
environmental regulation instrument
research and development incentive
dynamic efficiency
Bertrand mod- el
product heterogeneity
